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Abstract 
 
Futures analysis through scenario building has become a common tool in 
framing debates around the strategic planning of rural policy and rural 
development in Europe and elsewhere.  This paper examines the take up of 
such techniques in rural policy-making in Britain.  It begins by developing a 
sociology of scenario-building by government.  In Britain, this concerns not 
only the generalities of contemporary political culture but also the specificity 
of New Labour politics (and, by implication, the influence on central 
government of discourses of rurality).  It briefly reviews recently-
commissioned rural futures studies, with particular emphasis on the 
Strategic Futures exercise, prepared for the Department for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Tomorrow Project’s State of 
the Countryside 2020 prepared for the Countryside Agency – the statutory 
agency responsible for advising the Government on rural affairs.  The paper 
then concludes by considering the dilemmas around knowledge production 
in rural scenario-building. 
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Introduction 
 
Futures studies have proliferated in recent years both in the corporate world 
and among public sector bodies.  Their origins lie in strategic planning by 
large organisations such as Shell and the Rand Corporation, but also in the 
Limits to Growth modelling exercise of the early 1970s (Meadows et al., 
1972).  Futurology has even permeated the shelves of popular, non-fiction: 
 
“This is an extraordinary time to be alive.  The world is being 
transformed before our eyes from a technological twentieth 
century society into something altogether new and different.  
Are you ready for the future?” (Dixon, 1998, back cover). 
 
Patrick Dixon’s book, Futurewise, (Dixon, 1998) is an example of the kind 
of futurology paperback available in the business sections of bookstores in 
airport departure lounges.  “Either we take hold of the future or the future 
will take hold of us”, the front cover warns.  The author continues, 
excitedly: 
 
“That means planning to change tomorrow, future-thinking at 
every level, taking a broad view to out-plot the opposition.  
Being futurewise is about more than mere predictions, it’s 
about shaping the future, making history, having contingencies, 
staying one step ahead and in control” (p.ix). 
 
Yet such rhetoric is merely the popular version of a widespread interest in 
thinking about what might happen in 5, 10, 20 and even 50 years.  Scenario-
building exercises are produced with increasing frequency from all manner 
of organisations.  This is partly because of the belief that a better grasp of 
what the future may hold improves our scope to influence change.  
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According to Bob Tyrrell, former Chairman of the Henley Centre for 
Forecasting: 
 
“without an understanding or an exploration … of what the 
future may hold we lack the freedom to make the most of our 
opportunities and to control our destinies” (Tyrrell, 1997, 
p.387, emphasis in original). 
 
In Britain, the current ‘New Labour’ Government has instigated a wide 
range of futures studies.  Now coordinated by the Government's Cabinet 
Office Strategy Unit, various futures analyses have been developed for the 
domains of bioscience, electronic networks, energy, geographic mobility, 
GM crops, high performance cities, small businesses, social exclusion, 
social capital, transport, the workforce and even the future of government 
itself (see for example, Performance and Innovation Unit, 1999; 2001).  
Strategic futures analysis lies at the heart of the Government’s political 
ideology and modus operandi. 
 
Such studies have been particularly numerous in the sphere of rural policy 
(Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [Defra], 2001; 
2003a,b; Moynagh & Worsley, 2003).1  Rural scenario-building is a 
relatively novel, if problematic, phenomenon.  It is problematic because of 
the nature of rural policy institutions and the associated discourses of 
rurality in Britain, but also because of the nature of the social science that 
informs the scenario-building process.  Until very recently, rural social 
                                                
1
 The proliferation of rural futures studies is not limited to the UK, however.  For example, the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) has followed its study of environmental futures (EEA, 
2000) with a recent scenario building project on the future of rural land use across Europe (EEA, 
2004).  
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sciences and futurology have, for the most part, been pursued independently 
of each other.  This is because of their different foci and intellectual 
traditions.  It is also because of the ways in which rurality has generally 
been conceptualised in Western society.  Overwhelmingly, the assumption 
has been that the sources of futures — the drivers of change and innovation 
— are invariably to be found in the urban context and, more particularly, 
within large, urban-based corporations and governmental institutions.  Rural 
areas, therefore, are cast as inherently traditional and conservative.  They lie 
in the domain of the past and are, at worst, passive recipients, and at best 
moderating ‘filters’, of exogenous forces for change.   
 
The focus of much rural research is on the effectiveness of rural areas in 
adapting to, or resisting, the forces of modernity.  Such an intellectual 
perspective does little to foster a future orientation in rural studies.  
Likewise, ‘futurology’, in looking for the sources of social or technological 
innovation, is seldom inclined to focus on rural areas or practices.  
Admittedly, rural studies has, of late, included explorations of the 
endogenous approach to rural development in which symbolic/cultural and 
social resources (local/regional specificity) can be recruited to drive socio-
economic regeneration (see, for example, Ray, 1999; 2003).  However, the 
dominant discourse in debates about rural change in Britain and across 
much of Europe still tends to cast rural areas as repositories of tradition and 
changelessness, rather than as sources of dynamism in their own right.  Such 
representations accord with British political traditions.  Casting rural areas 
as the repository of the traditional has long been one of the essences of 
British Toryism while the Labour Party, when in power, has tended to stress 
the need instead for the modernisation of the countryside. 
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We therefore see the role of futurology in public policy formation as a 
(political) sociological phenomenon worthy of study in its own right and we 
argue that there are particular issues that arise in relation to the application 
of scenario-building to the rural domain.  Scenario-analysis — in the sense 
of a formal technique applied to timescales of a generation or longer — was 
devised and developed by and for large private sector organisations.  Central 
to the technique is a sense of systematic, rational analysis: that any given 
exercise must seek to transcend presently held assumptions and the agendas 
of interest groups.  However, the use of futures studies within central 
government and its agencies will be a function of the vigour of the abiding 
political ideology (that is, ‘modernisation’ in the current British context), 
and of the inherent nature of institutions.  Despite the apparent enthusiasm 
of individuals within the UK Government (including the Prime Minister) to 
incorporate long-term and radical thinking into the process of policy 
formation, ambitions for the use of futures thinking may be severely 
constrained.  These constraints include both those of a general nature that 
would affect all government-sponsored futurology — a function of 
institutions and the prevailing political culture — and those arising 
specifically from contemporary rural discourses.   
 
Second, we suggest rural social sciences, generally, have yet to devise 
methods for their academic participation in public policy scenario exercises.  
This is a problem insofar as academics and think-tank personnel are either 
required to perform as expert consultants in the process or are 
commissioned to undertake such studies themselves.  Although rural social 
sciences are inherently associated with the wellbeing of rural areas, the 
disciplines do not yet have a coherent method to speculate on alternative 
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futures, some options of which might be of a very low order of probability 
indeed.   This raises questions about the production of knowledge, and of 
the role of expertise and experience in the process (see Collins and Evans, 
2002).  
 
This paper is in three parts.  The first offers the first steps in the 
development of a sociology of government scenario-building activity.  In 
the UK, this concerns not only the generalities of contemporary political 
culture, but also the specificity of New Labour politics (and, by implication, 
in our specific case the influence on central government of discourses of 
rurality).  The next section reviews different products from recently-
commissioned rural futures studies: the Strategic Futures exercise, prepared 
as an internal discussion document for Defra from work carried out by the 
Henley Centre – an international strategic marketing consultancy (Defra, 
2001); and the Tomorrow Project’s State of the Countryside 2020 prepared 
for the Countryside Agency – the statutory agency responsible for advising 
the Government on issues of socio-economic well-being and landscape 
protection in rural areas (Moynagh & Worsley, 2003).  In the third part, we 
explore the issue of knowledge production in rural scenario-building 
activity.  The dominant mode of working in British rural futurology has 
been the systematic synthesis of informed expertise, and the implications of 
this are considered. 
 
Futures thinking in rural policy has been given a new impetus in recent 
years by Defra’s ‘horizon scanning’ programme, launched in January 2002.  
Defra’s definition of horizon scanning is: 
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“the systematic examination of potential threats, opportunities 
and likely future developments which are at the margins of 
current thinking and planning. Horizon scanning may explore 
novel and unexpected issues, as well as persistent problems or 
trends.  Overall, horizon scanning is intended to improve the 
robustness of Defra’s policies and evidence base” (Defra, 
2002, p.3). 
 
The programme also signals Defra’s commitment to the using futures 
studies to inform public debate about rural areas and to influence the design 
of future policy interventions (Defra, 2003a,b).  It includes scanning 
projects under four themes: ‘Rethinking the food economy’; ‘Coping with 
threats’; ‘Future landscapes’ and ‘Meeting people’s future needs’.  To date, 
a range of projects on risks to the UK food chain, national bio-security, 
trends in sustainable rural policy and land use, and future fisheries and 
marine ecosystems has been commissioned. 
 
Towards a Sociology of Government Policy Scenario-building  
 
The recent fashion for rural futures studies comes in the wake of an 
increasing appetite across government for scenario analysis to inform 
strategic planning in Britain.  In 1993, the Conservative Government 
launched a ‘technology foresight exercise’ in part inspired by German and 
Japanese approaches to strategic planning of technology and business 
development.  This was a Post-Thatcherite effort to reintroduce a form of 
strategic state planning into the government’s investment activity, 
particularly with respect to science and science policy, and was promoted by 
Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.  However, 
it was the arrival of the New Labour government in 1997 that gave greatest 
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impetus to the diffusion of futures studies.  Its political rhetoric of 
pragmatism, modernization and reform gave rise not only to the slavish 
pursuit of “what works” but also unleashed a surge of so-called ‘blue-skies’ 
thinking to inform policy change.  In 1998, the Government established the 
Prime Minister’s Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU)2 in the Cabinet 
Office to examine strategic and cross-cutting issues facing government, and 
a core work-stream was established to address ‘strategic challenges and 
futures’ (see PIU, 2001).   
 
Foresight futures work also continued in other parts of government with the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), for example, commissioning 
scenario analysis in 1998 (Office for Science and Technology, 1998) and in 
2002 (DTI, 2002) from the Science Policy Research Unit at the University 
of Sussex.  The two key axes in these scenarios are social values (ranging 
from individualist to more community-oriented values) and systems of 
governance (ranging from national and sub-national autonomy towards 
international interdependence).  The resultant four scenarios — termed 
‘world markets’, ‘national enterprise’, ‘global responsibility’ and ‘local 
stewardship’ — have become widely used among public sector agencies in 
other futures and foresight studies.  Although these scenarios were not 
objectively derived and are open to criticism, their semi-official profile, and 
the fact that they were produced early in the current wave of futures studies 
in the UK have meant they have influenced much subsequent scenario-
building, suggesting a form of ‘path-dependence’ in British futures studies 
has set in.    
 
                                                
2
 The PIU subsequently became subsumed within the new Strategy Unit in 2002. 
 9 
We argue that a sociology of contemporary rural scenario-building needs to 
operate on three interrelated levels.  First, rural futurology must be 
understood in terms of the general nature of government: of whatever era or 
political doctrine.  Second, the contemporary situation will be a function of 
the New Labour ideology of ‘modernisation’.  Third, the array of rural 
discourses that inform the views of rural residents, Defra and rural agencies 
and rural social sciences will need to be analysed; especially so as to avoid 
an overly rural-centric set of assumptions regarding the most significant 
drivers of rural social and economic change.  The last of these, we will 
address later in the article. 
 
Scenario-building is presented by its advocates as a device to enable 
organisations to think about the long term future.  It incorporates not only 
contingency planning (planning how to cope with future crises such as acts 
of international terrorism or, in the rural context, the next major outbreak of 
an animal disease such as Foot and Mouth Disease) but also imagining 
normative visions of desirable futures to aim for, and undesirable outcomes 
to avoid.  Organisations of all types can find themselves caught in the 
tyranny of the velocity of incidents, endlessly reacting to today’s problems.  
This is particularly true in the political domain.  When asked by a young 
journalist what most preoccupied his government, British Prime Minister 
from 1957 to 1963, Harold Macmillan, famously replied “events, dear boy, 
events”.  According to the MP Vincent Cable in a recent BBC radio 
broadcast (BBC, 2002), the reality of national government remains that 
“important long-term decisions are taken very often .... in a state of panic”.  
In the same broadcast, Geoff Mulgan — former Director of Demos, a 
London-based think tank, and subsequently head of the Government’s 
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Strategy Unit — commented that the time horizons for political thinking in 
national government, and therefore temporal frameworks in which policy is 
designed, have become so short as to be counter-productive.  Writing in 
1997, he observed: “there can’t have been many times in human history 
when so many problems have demanded fresh ideas and new thinking” 
(Mulgan, 1997, p.ix). Yet, paradoxically, whilst many of the pressing 
problems are collective ones, the world of politics “feels like a backwater, a 
declining industry struggling to keep up, rather than a place of imagination 
and energy” (p.ix).  
 
Policies and public investments quickly become inadequate or 
inappropriate.  The implication is that were the political process to take the 
longer view, policies and interventions would result that were more in tune 
with major drivers of change that operate on various long-term wavelengths.  
Whereas forecasting tries to predict futures by extrapolating from historical 
trends and present circumstances, scenarios are built by attempting to 
transcend the short-term and to speculate about possible futures (plural).  
Scenario-analysis is advocated as a catalyst for thinking and as a set of 
techniques to drive the deep reflection necessary for the timescales 
involved, most commonly for periods of 5, 10 or 20 years. 
 
Yet, the UK Government’s sponsoring of scenario-building is not solely a 
matter of introducing a technique that would re-align policy-making so as to 
respond more closely with wide-scale social, political and economic forces 
for change.  New Labour presents itself as being in pursuit of a reforming 
political agenda: a discourse of ‘modernisation’.  This requires the 
Government to examine the future of labour markets, public sector service 
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provision, transport, energy production, the role of government intervention 
and so on.  In the rural sector, additional futurological issues include food 
production (public subsidies through the Common Agricultural Policy, 
biotechnology and public health issues) and land use regulation.  Moreover, 
it is in the rural domain where the application of futurology highlights 
certain ongoing tensions.   The modernisation agenda comes up against the 
socio-economic plight of many British rural areas: in terms of historical 
trajectories and recent crises such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease.  As a result, 
the inherent conservativism of much of British rurality is reinforced by the 
implicit and explicit mobilisation of political resistance (most notably in the 
guise of the Countryside Alliance but also including the environmental 
movement and others).  The building of rural scenarios, when it enters the 
public domain, thus becomes an act of real-life politics.  For New Labour, 
rural futures analyses can be seen as a means of counteracting rural 
traditionalism (i.e. Toryism).  Through raising debates about longer-term 
socio-economic trends and drivers, more contemporary conflicts (such as 
around low farming incomes, for example) are displaced, which puts rural 
Toryism on the back-foot. 
 
For Mulgan, scenario-building is about the encouragement of strategic 
thinking within government as well as identifying where the issues involved 
necessitate interaction between Departments.  Yet there is widespread 
recognition of the divide that exists between, on the one hand, the logical 
necessity and benefits of scenario-building in government and, on the other, 
the reality of present-day society.  First, the Departments of central 
government are, by their ethos, institutions.  Their role in society is to 
promote certainty and confidence, to legitimise the status quo and, 
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according to the bureaucratic ethos, to discharge their responsibilities 
objectively and transparently.  By definition, therefore, they are 
conservative and bureaucratic.  It would seem paradoxical, therefore, for 
institutions to push their corporate imagination into long-term possible 
futures.  It is partly for this reason, therefore, that the Government has 
tended to use outside consultants to undertake future studies that it 
commissions.  However, this still leaves the question of how a government 
would impregnate its administrative wing with new, revolutionary 
scenarios, were there to be the political will to do this. 
 
Second, the contemporary political culture is characterised by inter-party 
competitiveness and an aggressive and sceptical media, to which we could 
add a citizenry significant parts of which have attained Galbraith's ‘culture 
of contentment’ (Galbraith, 1992).  As a result, politicians cannot afford to 
entertain competing ideas: the uncertainty and timescales of alternative 
futures.  It is therefore difficult for public bodies to be identified as being 
directly responsible for generating such ideas or for appearing to subscribe 
to them.  Given that scenarios are meant both to challenge current 
assumptions and to speculate on mega-trajectories of change, any 
government or mainstream political party that sponsors them is taking a 
risk. 
 
In the present climate, this is an almost insurmountable barrier facing 
scenario activity within government.   Or rather, the barrier is to the use of 
scenarios directly to influence the design of government policies and 
interventions in the short term, through the process of back-casting 
(Dreborg, 1996; Höjer and Mattsson, 2000).  If, on the other hand, the 
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purpose of scenarios is to influence debates in the public arena — to nurture 
a new ideology — in the realisation that government intervention might be 
limited or even impossible, then this would pose far less peril for 
governments sponsoring scenario-building. 
 
Two Rural Futures Studies 
 
Given these tensions between the principles of scenario-building and the 
dynamics of government, what has been the experience so far when the 
Government Department responsible for rural policy and its agencies have 
commissioned rural scenario studies?  Here we examine two recent 
exercises in scenario-building for rural England.  Scenario analysis 
identifies and assesses the key drivers shaping socio-economic and 
environmental conditions in rural areas and then attempts to sketch out 
alternative future scenarios.  Scenarios are usually given ‘catchy’ names 
which help evoke how these future worlds might look.  Our first example is 
a scenario-building exercise instigated within a Government Department. 
 
Strategic Futures exercise (2001)  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) found itself at the 
heart of a series of food and farming crises during the late 1980s and 1990s.  
These culminated in the BSE crisis in 1996, when the potential link between 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cows and the new variant of 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in humans had to be acknowledged by 
Ministers for the first time, prompting a ban on the exports of British beef.  
MAFF became an increasingly embattled Department, and recognised by 
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senior ministers of the incoming Labour Government in 1997 as a ‘suitable 
case for treatment’.  
 
A fresh start was signalled in 2000 with the appointment of a new Permanent 
Secretary.  Brian Bender, formerly a senior civil servant in the Cabinet 
Office, took over from Sir Richard Packer, who had been at MAFF’s helm 
since 1993.  Bender established a new Policy and Corporate Strategy Unit to 
help ‘modernise MAFF’.  The Unit’s remit was set out in MAFF’s 2001 
Departmental report as follows: 
 
“The new Policy and Corporate Strategy Unit will take forward 
long-term policy planning and the internal corporate change 
that will be required to reflect this.  The Unit provides a clearer 
focus on both issues that cut across MAFF and long-term 
strategy” (MAFF, 2001, para 2.11). 
 
Among its first tasks in early 2001, the Unit commissioned a scenario-
building exercise to assist in the Ministry’s strategic planning.  The study 
can be seen as part of the effort to rescue MAFF from its crisis ridden past 
by looking to the future.  The work was conducted by the Henley Centre but 
was never published, as MAFF became embroiled in the Foot and Mouth 
Disease crisis, which broke in February 2001, and was then replaced by 
Defra in June (see Henley Centre, 2001, p. 12 & p.16).  The objectives of the 
strategic futures project were set out as follows: 
 
• to provide a strategic plan for the Department within which other 
strategies, like those for e-business and science, can live and develop; 
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• to help improve Defra’s strategic thinking capability and so to develop 
existing policies to meet likely developments in 5-10 years time; 
• to provide a sense of collective understanding by Government, 
stakeholders and society as a whole about the issues faced by the 
Department; 
• to help identify the Department’s strategic priorities for food, farming 
and rural areas for the next Spending Review, in partnership with 
stakeholders within and outside Government; 
• to enable [Defra] to work better with our stakeholders to identify 
creative and innovative solutions and practical measures that can help 
us to achieve our strategic goals. 
 
The first phase of the work identified a series of drivers which it was felt 
would shape the future environment.  This phase drew on analysis carried 
out within Government, academia, international organizations and through 
independent research by the Henley Centre.  Hundreds of separate drivers 
were identified and, through a workshop, these were structured into social, 
technological, environmental, economic and political categories and 
prioritized.  Social drivers included: the growth of ‘empowered 
consumerism’; the search for authenticity and simplicity in consumption 
practices; residential preference for rural localities; the increasing impact of 
diverse cultural influences on consumer demand; and the segmentation of 
society into ‘disciplined’ and ‘undisciplined’ eaters.  Technological drivers 
included: the miniaturization of everything; the spread of broadband and 
information and communication technologies; and the rise of e-commerce 
and genomics.  Economic drivers included: the relative decline of 
agriculture; rising disposable household incomes; increasing income and 
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wealth inequalities; and international economic integration.  Environmental 
drivers included:  increasing pressure for action to reduce climate change; 
continued deterioration in biodiversity and the quality of semi-natural 
landscapes and habitats; and increasing public questioning of new genomic 
technologies.  Political drivers included: the continued dominance of 
economic liberalism; the expansion of the European Union; the 
development of the World Trade Organization; and continued pressure for 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.  
 
The project’s second phase transposed what were considered to be the most 
influential drivers onto two axes.  One axis – social values – ranged from 
the countryside as a place of production to a place of consumption.  A 
second axis – economic governance – ranged from a market-led to a public-
funding perspective.  This produced four scenarios shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Axes for Scenario Development in Defra’s Strategic Futures 
Exercise 
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The Defra discussion paper emphasized that the scenarios were not 
predictions of the future, nor statements of government policy.  (Indeed, this 
health warning was stated on the header and footer of every page of the 
internal Defra document).  Nevertheless, they were framed as a tool to help 
policy-makers think about the longer term future, in this particular case the 
future in 2011.  Under the ‘Crossroads’ scenario, the development of rural 
areas is dominated by commercial interests.  Supermarket dominance of the 
food chain continues.  Dependence upon the private car, and at the same 
time social exclusion, increases.  Local distinctiveness is eroded and 
pressure to liberalise the planning system increases and is increasingly 
successful.   Under the ‘Last of the Summer Wine’ scenario, agricultural 
support continues, but under a stronger environmental management 
imperative.  Tax is hypothecated to fund public transport and the demand 
for authentic local foods increases significantly.  The countryside becomes a 
rather ‘twee’ and idealized place, and home to an increasingly aged 
population.  Under the ‘From Brussels with Love’ scenario, a protectionist 
Common Agricultural Policy continues, declining rural services require 
considerable public subsidy, and the environmental impacts of rural land 
management continue to cause controversy.  Under ‘The Good Life’ 
scenario, farming declines to only 50% of rural land use as rural leisure 
industries thrive and the market for luxury rural tourism expands. Land 
values become more volatile but younger people move back to rural areas 
and civil society is energised. 
 
The Strategic Futures exercise was used internally to provoke debate on the 
strategic direction of Defra’s policies.  The scenarios also prompted some 
controversy on Channel 4 News when they were considered (wrongly) as 
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‘extreme options’ being considered by Defra (see Henley Centre, 2001, 
p.16).   However, the work was simply overtaken by events.  The Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD) crisis dominated MAFF’s work throughout the spring 
of 2001 until the Ministry’s demise immediately after the June General 
Election.  In its election manifesto, the Labour Government committed itself 
to three separate reviews of aspects of the FMD crisis, including one on the 
future of food and farming.  The Henley Centre work was shown to one of 
these, the Policy Commission on the Future of Food and Farming, chaired 
by Sir Don Curry, and helped inform the Commission’s deliberations.  
However, although crises such as FMD generate demands for fundamental 
changes of direction, they are generally not conducive to the long-term 
thinking that this requires.  The ideas in the strategic futures work on rural 
futures thus became absorbed and dissolved in a narrower report on the 
competitiveness of the farming industry. 
 
The Tomorrow Project’s State of the Countryside 2020 (2003) 
 
A similar study was commissioned by the Countryside Agency soon after 
Defra’s Strategic Futures work.  The study was carried out by the Tomorrow 
Project, “an independent charity supporting organizations and individuals in 
thinking about the future of people’s lives in the UK over the next 20 years” 
(Moynagh & Worsley, 2003, p.6) and was published in March 2003 as the 
Countryside Agency’s State of the Countryside 2020 report.  The project 
involved a desk-based review, interviews with policy experts in Defra, the 
Countryside Agency and elsewhere and with academics from the 
Universities of Gloucestershire, Nottingham and Leicester.  Consultees were 
asked four questions: Where are we now?  What will shape the future?  
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What possible futures exist? And ‘so what’? (p.13).  The main drivers were 
deemed to be the global economy; the rise of consumer choice and ‘the 
experience economy’, the spread of information and communication 
technologies; the spread of skills shortages; the expansion of the middle 
classes and increasing pressures to achieve environmental sustainability.   
 
From these drivers, the analysis went on to consider who will live in the 
countryside, the dynamics of housing development and the demographic 
complexion of migration to and from rural areas.  It explored the nature of 
rural economies and livelihoods in four different geographical contexts – the 
‘suburban countryside’, the ‘urban countryside’, the ‘rural countryside’ and 
the ‘ex-industrial countryside’.  It then reflected on likely quality of life in 
terms of the natural environment, access to services, political autonomy, 
crime and social exclusion. 
 
The exercise produced the following four scenarios: ‘The countryside means 
businesses; ‘Go for green’; ‘All on board’; and ‘The triple whammy’.  All 
assumed sustained economic growth and were constructed around the extent 
to which the countryside becomes environmentally sustainable and socially 
cohesive.  In ‘The countryside means business’ rural England develops in an 
environmentally unsustainable direction and is socially fragmented. ‘Go for 
green!’ describes a more environmentally sustainable future, but one in 
which the countryside is also more socially fragmented.  ‘All on board!’ is a 
scenario in which greater social cohesion combines with less environmental 
sustainability.  In ‘The triple whammy’, environmental, social and economic 
sustainability are combined (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Scenarios under the State of the Countryside 2020 
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The report was launched at a seminar in London in April 2003 before an 
audience of policy officials, politicians, academics and rural lobby groups.  
Much discussion focused on the desirability or otherwise of the different 
scenarios.  Graham Wynne, the Chief Executive of the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds, the UK’s largest environmental organization, said that 
he felt that the ‘go for green’ scenario was unlikely to be realised because its 
proponents lacked sufficient economic power.  The most likely future he 
saw was one of ‘muddling through’3.  It was suggested that the Countryside 
Agency should choose a scenario as the desirable end point, trace backwards 
to what sorts of policy decisions would be required to deliver it.  In other 
words, such futures exercises should immediately inform action.  Most 
participants agreed that the analysis was interesting and stimulating, but 
                                                
3
 This discussion is informed by participation at the seminar and by the note of the discussions 
subsequently circulated to participants by the Countryside Agency.  
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there was little consensus on what could be done with it, let lone which was 
the most preferable scenario to pursue. 
 
Making sense of futures studies 
 
So,  here we have two officially-commissioned rural future exercises: one 
from the Department responsible for rural matters and the other from an 
agency with a remit for policy advice and innovation.  The component 
scenarios are not radically different in each study, reflecting the 
methodological approach used in both cases and the relatively modest 
timescales involved (10 to 20 years).  
 
What can we learn from the two exercises described above and government-
sponsored rural futurology in general?  There are two approaches to 
evaluation.  First, we can evaluate a scenario exercise according to the uses 
to which they are subsequently put.  As we have already noted, neither of 
them appears to have been incorporated directly into the government policy 
formation process which might undermine their value.  We have suggested 
above that the transfer of futurological knowledge to the politico-
administrative domain is likely to be obstructed or modified by present 
conditions.  Yet, this does not necessarily mean that rural futurology is 
doomed.  Brand (1999), for example, argues that society would benefit from 
the promotion of thinking about longer-term futures in any and all domains 
of life.  The act of thinking about possible futures, according to Brand, 
stimulates an enhanced consciousness throughout society about the nature of 
problems and their solutions.  A reforming government, therefore, might use 
scenario planning exercises to generate debates in the public domain, 
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cultivating social attitudes and beliefs prior to government intervention in 
the future. 
 
The other approach to evaluation is to investigate the methodological and 
empirical bases on which any scenario exercise is based.  This is the focus 
of the following sections.  In the introduction we argued that futures 
knowledge will be very different in nature from orthodox social science.  
What, therefore, are the rules of engagement for rural social scientists 
contributing to the building of scenarios?  And what would it mean for rural 
social sciences to pursue academic rigor when speculating about the future 
in 20 or 50 years time? 
 
The Types of Knowledge in Rural Futures Studies: Whose Rural 
Futures?   
 
Futures studies tend to be compiled for government agencies by consultants 
who have an interest in emphasising the structured and systematic process 
by which the analysis is conducted and the outcome – a considered review of 
a selection of contrasting possible futures and their implications – is arrived 
at.  Methodologies include various stages, with safeguards, checks and 
balances, all aimed at making the analysis (and the scenarios) as sensible, 
plausible or ‘robust’ as is possible.  The Henley Centre (2001), in their 
report for the Performance and Innovation Unit on ‘Understanding Best 
Practice in Strategic Futures Work’, for example, set out seven stages in the 
scenario development process.  These include developing a range of drivers, 
testing their credibility through a workshop, subjecting them to an 
uncertainty analysis/dependency review and so on.  Yet  there is a critical 
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tension between the technocratic discourses within which scenario planning 
and analysis exercises are couched and the nature of the knowledge 
produced: 
 
“Organisations embark on strategic futures work because 
they want to know what the future will hold.  However, 
sometimes they confuse prediction with understanding.  
Managers want to reduce the anxiety caused by the 
uncertainty of not knowing.  This immediately creates a 
source of disappointment, for it is never possible to know 
the future .… Organisations are able to make effective use 
of strategic futures work only when they accept that it is 
impossible to predict future outcomes” (Henley Centre, 
2001, p.3). 
 
This tension reflects that between two contrasting models of social science 
itself.  One aligns social sciences as ‘hard sciences’ alongside natural and 
biological sciences and assumes that natural regularities exist and can be 
identified among groups and societies.  Where these ‘social laws of nature’ 
have been identified, and adequate data are available, then it should be 
possible to predict at least the near future.  A second conception sees the 
social sciences as reform movements that have “cloaked themselves in 
methodological rigor in order to exploit the pro-science bias of the very 
society they seek to change” (Bainbridge, 2003, p.634).  Here predictions are 
more likely to be normative and prescriptive rather than descriptive, 
“advocating the future that ought to exist rather than the one that necessarily 
will exist” (p.634). 
 
A difficulty is that the producers of scenarios have only limited influence 
over how the scenarios are consumed.  Thus, the Henley Centre stresses that 
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“strategic futures work is about rehearsal rather than knowledge” (2001, 
p.18), but once they are received by the consumers of futures work scenarios 
can take on a life of their own.   What are intended as imaginary constructs, 
or tools to assist thinking, can quickly mutate into forecasts, or even 
desirable policy objectives.  Little wonder, then, that some Government 
Departments have been slow to share their scenario analyses with wider 
publics. 
 
The dominant mode of working in current rural futurology in the UK is the 
systematic synthesis of informed expertise.  Consultants quiz a small 
number of recognized ‘experts’ (usually within policy-making bodies, 
specialist interest groups and academia) or perhaps convene a brainstorming 
workshop. This may be coupled with quantitative analysis of available 
statistical datasets.  This is the main approach used in the above examples 
and most other scenario exercises.  However, in thinking through the 
implications for a futurological rural studies paradigm — as an academic 
pursuit and as a demand on public financing — the matter of timescales is 
crucial.   The drivers of change operate on a range of waveforms of different 
frequencies over time.  Brand (1999) argues that science (particularly, in our 
case, social science) needs to give more attention to the accumulation of 
empirical data along periods of time that correspond with the timescales of 
the drivers/systems concerned.  However, as Brand acknowledges, this 
‘slow science’ is not generally encouraged (in that it is very difficult to 
ensure very long term public funding for such projects).  Yet the 
accumulation of long databases will be crucial.  The futurology debate as 
discussed in this paper is not merely about how academics and others could 
participate in the current crop of scenario-building projects; it is also about 
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how (rural) social science will be conducted in order for its contribution to 
futurology to be more effective and rigorous.  Brand thus calls for very 
long-term, sustained, longitudinal studies.  We would add, also, that such 
studies should be undertaken on the basis of social and spatial units of 
observation that are sufficiently fine that they can be recombined into larger 
units of analysis as necessary. 
 
Schwartz (2003), on the other hand, suggests another, rather different 
component.  An awareness of historical analysis, he argues, reveals the 
crucial role of ‘powerful ideas’ as drivers of change (and/or resistance to 
change).  The invitation here is for futurology systematically to incorporate 
ideas: ideologies, technological inventions; and conceptual frameworks such 
as characterisations of society.  This requires a theory of the derivation and 
ascendancy of ‘big ideas’.  Schwartz argues that over the appropriate 
timescales, one can see an evolution of ideas: that the emergence and then 
acceptance of an idea thereby enables the emergence of its successor ideas.  
This leads Schwartz to argue that, armed with a consciousness of historical 
process, futurology exercises should be asking, explicitly, “what ideas do 
we need now”.  In this respect, the practice alluded to above — of scenarios 
being constructed out of expert consensus (that is, a majority or least 
controversial view) may not always capture the most powerful drivers; a 
technique by which to capture the maverick (outlier) opinion may also be 
necessary. 
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Rural Futures and the Scope for Action 
 
In this paper we have begun to develop a sociology of government scenario-
building, by briefly examining the structure and dynamics of the actors 
involved and identifying which discourses are informing the scenario-
building process.  Scenario analysis was initially developed as a planning 
tool in the corporate sector, but has been embraced by those parts of 
government responsible for strategic analysis, particularly policy units and 
strategy units.  The analysis of drivers is usually conducted by 
commissioned external consultants, although sometimes through the use of 
scoping workshops involving ‘insider’ policy specialists.  Notably, in the 
sphere of rural futures analysis, there is a strong degree of commonality in 
both the main drivers selected and the axes used to produce future scenarios 
— economic liberalism versus intervention and protectionism, and 
individual versus collective social values.  It is useful to ask (though space 
does not allow in this paper) why these axes should be so common, and what 
might others look like.   
 
We have also explored the implications of scenario-building activity for 
academic rural studies.  Some social science disciplines have recently been 
debating their utility in terms of influencing public policy.  In human 
geography, for example, Martin has argued that “much contemporary social 
and economic geography research renders it of little practical relevance for 
policy” (2001, p.189) and has pleaded for what he calls a new ‘policy turn’ 
in the discipline.  He identified a need to take rigorous empirical work more 
seriously and halt the drift towards ‘thin empirics’ (see also Peck, 1999).   
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Rural futures studies commonly draw in academic social scientists to inform 
the selection of drivers, the production of scenarios and consideration of 
their possible implications for policy choices.  The audience for such studies 
is supposed to be those responsible for strategic policy development.  Thus, 
in one sense, engaging with futures exercises provides social scientists with 
an opportunity to answer Martin’s call to “visualize alternative futures” and 
engage with “fundamental debates over the direction of society, economy 
and environment” (p.203) and so engage with policy-making.  However, in 
another sense, the process of futures studies themselves provides a rich 
research topic, as actors engage with each other to debate their competing 
visions of the future, and at the same time often question the epistemological 
basis of scenarios and scenario-production.   
 
The two case studies illustrate the discourses and issues involved in (rural) 
futures analysis. ‘Modernisation’ is at the core of New Labour’s programme, 
and although modernization entails worries about the past and about the 
present, above all it entails worries about the future (Finlayson, 2003, p.94).  
The use of scenario analysis epitomizes one of the core dilemmas and 
contradictions at the heart of the New Labour Government’s project.  New 
Labour is a managerialist government working within a neo-liberal 
orthodoxy.  This paradox produces what Finlayson calls the “strange pathos” 
of New Labour: 
 
“They really want to change things, and think they know 
how to, but have no real understanding of how change 
happens and so find themselves frustrated, becoming more 
inward-looking, zealous and increasingly buffeted by 
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events.  They are, in the end, the victim of circumstances 
they feel are beyond their control” (2003, p.11). 
 
The question of what can be changed or influenced through public policy 
interventions, and what are exogenous (‘market’) forces that simply have to 
be responded to, is central to how scenarios are consumed and interpreted, 
for there is little purpose to futures analysis unless it is used to make 
decisions in the ‘here and now’. But the question of what lies within the 
realms of action tends to remain unanswered, as does the question of 
whether the legitimate scope for action changes over time. 
 
Think tanks such as Demos and the Institute for Public Policy Research have 
thrived on the production of reports highlighting transformationary social 
trends such as the ageing population, the pension time-bomb, the rise of the 
‘new economy’ and so on.  Such changes are almost always discovered to 
have profound implications and their discovery is essential to making New 
Labour’s modernization programme a strategy of problem generation, and 
even one of “governing the future” (Finlayson, 2003, p.94).  This is a 
distinctive form of political rationality. 
 
Rose and Millar define a political rationality as: 
 
“The changing discursive fields within which the exercise of 
power is conceptualized, the moral justifications for 
particular ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, 
notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of 
politics and conceptions of the proper distribution of tasks 
among secular, spiritual, military and familial advisers” 
(1992, p.175). 
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Within the contemporary discourse of modernization, wider economic and 
social changes are given an air of inevitability.  The political and social 
challenge is to face these changes.  We must ‘modernise or die’.  Charles 
Leadbeater, a think-tank based futurologist respected by Prime Minister 
Blair,4 has argued that the economic and technological transformations 
embodied in the ‘new economy’ cannot be avoided.  “We have to go through 
it … we have to steel ourselves to press on, not really sure what lies ahead, 
but knowing that retreat is no alternative” (Leadbeater, 1999, p.3): 
 
“This is why modernization can mean a lot to those who 
advocate it, as it seems like the only way to respond to a 
situation that is out of control.  But it is, at least in part, the 
discourse of modernization that generates these problems, 
just as it generates their solution.  The solipsism is lived as 
much as it is spoken” (Finlayson, 2003, p.95). 
 
Thus what can be changed is the central dilemma facing the producers and 
users of futures analysis.  And for Government-sponsored futurology, this 
question is filtered through a particular political perspective that casts some 
processes as amenable to intervention, while others lie outside the realms of 
public policy, as inevitable and inexorable.  This dilemma comes into sharp 
focus through the process of backcasting. 
 
Defra have recently begun commissioning further scenario analysis work 
under its horizon scanning programme, and contained within this work is an 
increasing interest in backcasting.   Within the horizon scanning programme, 
the ‘Rural Futures; scenario analysis and backcasting’ project is intended to 
                                                
4
 On the dust cover of Leadbeater’s book, Living On Thin Air, Blair is quoted:  “Charles 
Leadbeater is an extraordinarily interesting thinker.  His book raises critical questions for 
Britain’s future” 
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help operationalise the Government’s vision in its Rural White Paper 
(Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and MAFF, 
2000) by mapping out scenarios of what the countryside will or could look 
like in 20 and 50 years time, and to identify the stages in reaching these 
scenarios (see Future Foundation and Centre for Rural Economy, 2004).  
Scenario-building and predictive analysis has been employed to assess 
current and emerging drivers, trends, risks and opportunities so, the 
argument goes, that society can be better prepared for and resilient to future 
shocks and trends.   A particular interest in the project is in ‘backcasting’ — 
i.e. the application of scenario thinking to the policy process — where the 
steps are identified by which a desirable future scenario can be realised over 
time (Dreborg, 1996; Höjer and Mattsson, 2000).  
 
Backcasting is a term introduced by Robinson (1982; 1990; 2003).  It was 
first employed in energy futures studies, and has since been widely adopted 
in the fields of sustainable development, transport and waste management.  
The main distinguishing characteristic of backcasting analysis is a concern, 
not with what futures are likely to happen, but with how desirable futures 
can be attained.   
 
“It is thus explicitly normative, involving working backwards 
from a particularly desirable future end-point to the present in 
order to determine the physical feasibility of the future and 
what policy measures would be required to reach that point 
(1990, pp.822-23)”.  
 
Robinson (1990) suggests backcasting can be applied to scenario analysis of 
changes over 20 to 100 year timescales.  Its use in the context of 
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government-sponsored rural future studies is problematic in some key 
respects.  First, it contains an implicit model of social action that does not 
sit well with the prevailing approach to what lies within the realms of 
governmental influence and what lies outside.  If backcasting suggests the 
need for policy interventions to address drivers such as, for example, the 
liberalization of the global economy, and this trend is taken by government 
as a given outside of governmental control and influence, then the process 
leads to a dead-end.  Second, it is likely that few drivers are inherently 
‘rural.’  Thus, influence over many of the drivers of change affecting rural 
areas is likely to lie well beyond the policy remit of rural institutions.  A key 
question therefore arises of the analytical purchase of ‘rural’ in rural futures 
studies.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Several research questions emerge from this analysis.  The first is better to 
elucidate the role of futures work in agenda-setting in public policy for rural 
affairs.  Public agencies commission scenario analyses, but how are these 
studies ‘consumed’ by interested parties, and what influence, if any, do they 
have on policy debates and policy development?  The second is to examine 
whether different sorts of models of futures work in general and in the realm 
of rural policy in particular.  Do these models, moreover,  pose challenges 
for the British approach to rural futures work?  Third, in developing the 
relationships between ‘science and society’, what role might scenario 
analyses play in broadening participation in policy-making.   
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This third question of the roles and relationships between expertise and lay 
experience is one that has begun to preoccupy scholars in the social studies 
of science (see, for example, Collins and Evans, 2002).  It leads on to the 
question of whether rural experts are necessarily always the best or only 
informants in scenario-building exercises when timescales of, say, 35 years 
and longer are attempted.  Rural studies (rural sociology, agricultural 
economics and so on) can be seen in large measure as the pursuit of 
solutions for the problems facing rural areas and the constituent populations.  
Directly or indirectly, rural studies serve as an advocate for the desirability 
of the existence of that which it observes and analyses.  Although containing 
critical theorists and action researchers, the mainstream of contemporary 
rural studies has not traditionally been about speculating on radically 
alternative futures.  Even the methods of futurology generally pursue a linear 
approach by projecting forward from where a society or organisation 
presently is.  Not that this is necessarily a bad approach, but any new 
paradigm might benefit from the inclusion of normative approaches, in 
which one starts with ‘a (desirable) future’ and works backwards. 
 
Futurology is simultaneously scientific and unscientific (Blass, 2003).  In 
attempting to construct a future using systematic methods, it tries to be 
dispassionate, following the logic wherever it might lead.  Yet at the same 
time, implicit in the desire to undertake explorations of possible futures is a 
compassionate dimension: a compassion for the well-being of future 
generations.  In this paper, we have shown how futures analysis is becoming 
a new political rationality in rural policy in Britain as studies proliferate and 
begin to influence policy-makers’ understandings of trends, opportunities, 
threats and the possible scope for action.  Rural futures studies are 
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developing more and more refined techniques, but remain a technocratic 
form of analysis and policy-making.  Even though they displace many 
popular concerns (about risks and immediate policy choices, for example), 
the democratic and participatory aspects of such exercises are currently 
rather weak.  A challenge is therefore to develop futures studies techniques 
which open up involvement among a broader range of participants in the 
policy-making process. 
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